Confronting Western Conceptions of Non-Human Animal Cognition by Donato, Jinji
Rollins College
Rollins Scholarship Online
Master of Liberal Studies Theses
Spring 2019
Confronting Western Conceptions of Non-Human
Animal Cognition
Jinji Donato
jdonato@rollins.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.rollins.edu/mls
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons
This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by Rollins Scholarship Online. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master of Liberal
Studies Theses by an authorized administrator of Rollins Scholarship Online. For more information, please contact rwalton@rollins.edu.
Recommended Citation
Donato, Jinji, "Confronting Western Conceptions of Non-Human Animal Cognition" (2019). Master of Liberal Studies Theses. 89.
https://scholarship.rollins.edu/mls/89
  
 
 
 
 
Confronting Western Conceptions of Non-Human 
Animal Cognition 
 
 
A Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Liberal Studies 
 
by 
Jinji Donato 
May 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mentor:  Dr. Ryan Musgrave 
Reader: Dr. J. Thomas Cook 
 
Rollins College       
Hamilton Holt School 
Master of Liberal Studies Program             Winter Park, Florida 
  
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction ...........................................................................................................................  
Disciplines in Dialogue ................................................................................................... 1 
The Role of Rationality ................................................................................................... 4 
An Interdisciplinary Project............................................................................................. 6 
Section 1.............................................................................................................................. 9 
Ecofeminism as Theoretical Approach ............................................................................... 9 
Embracing an Alternative Ethic .................................................................................... 12 
Belief in Animal Mind (BAM) ...................................................................................... 14 
Section 2............................................................................................................................ 16 
Sketching the Western Conception of Animals ................................................................ 16 
Classical Conceptions .................................................................................................... 16 
Modern Conceptions...................................................................................................... 23 
Section 3............................................................................................................................ 32 
Scientific Conceptions of Animal Minds .......................................................................... 32 
Theory of Mind as Microcosm ...................................................................................... 34 
The Current Debate ....................................................................................................... 39 
Avoiding Anthropofabulation........................................................................................ 41 
Executive Control and Rational Inference..................................................................... 42 
Section 4............................................................................................................................ 45 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 45 
The Livestock Sector Impact ......................................................................................... 46 
Ecofeminist Constructs .................................................................................................. 48 
Diet Change ................................................................................................................... 50 
Works Cited ...................................................................................................................... 53 
 
Introduction 
Western literature is dappled with dialogue about animals. Since antiquity, 
philosophical texts have predominantly positioned animals as inferior to humans in most 
capacities. While the Western view of animals is by no means homogenous, 
philosophically speaking, a consensus that non-human animals lacked cognition, more 
specifically, a rational faculty, formed early on. Relatively few philosophers from the 
ancient world suggested non-human animals could experience more than pain and 
pleasure (Porphyry loc. 1696). Over the course of a longstanding cultural dialogue over 
animal capability, the Aristotelian view of humans as the only rational species, and 
consequently more valuable species in a hierarchy of being, seems to have prevailed 
(Nicomachean 14). In the modern era, Descartes’ mechanistic view and dualism, 
articulated in Discourse on Method, further demoted animals to a lowly status of mere 
automata (47). Historically, features of animal sentience, not rationality, have been the 
subject of debate regarding animal capability. The scientific community worked to settle 
this cultural debate in 2012 by concluding in the Cambridge Declaration of Animal 
Consciousness that “Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals have the 
neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states 
along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors” (Low “Cambridge..”). Despite 
formal scientific consensus on the matter of sentience, the popular and political 
perception of animals as beings with consciousness remains tenuous. A most recent case 
illustrating the popular and political vacillation on the status of animal sentience was the 
United Kingdom’s vote against retaining explicit language about animal sentience in 
post-Brexit law (Ares). In the context of EU law, the term animal is understood to mean
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vertebrates and upon exception, some invertebrates. With the passage of the EU 
Withdrawal Act of 2018, animal sentience is no longer recognized in UK law. Despite 
promises to legislate on the language of sentience before leaving the EU, 
parliamentarians have yet to come to an agreement. Intransigence on this issue stems in 
part from concerns voiced by members of The Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Committee. Committee members have claimed the ambiguity of the term sentience would 
have a litigious impact on the government (EFRA 10). The issues surrounding animal 
sentience in the context of Brexit provide one example of how the way animals are 
conceived of, described and defined can impact treatment and welfare. The apparent 
dissonance between the scientific community, public opinion and public policy led me to 
contemplate the Western conception of animal minds and question what traces of this 
conception might be found in contemporary practices such as animal agriculture and its 
role in the problem of climate change. 
Disciplines in Dialogue 
A handful of scholarly disciplines, interdisciplinary in nature, have emerged to 
formally study and elucidate human and animal interactions and their implications. These 
disciplines include anthrozoology, animal studies, vegetarian ecofeminism, critical 
animal studies and cognitive ethology. Research from these disciplines is conducted with 
an interest in exploring the hypothesized links between conceptions, opinions and beliefs 
about animal minds, levels of empathy toward animals and attitudes regarding the usage 
of animals. Specifically, a belief in animal mind (BAM) or the attribution of mental 
capacities to animals is correlated with greater empathy in the absence of utility (Hills). 
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Research into conceptions of animal cognition is sometimes referred to as theory of 
animal mind (TAM) (Spence). In the West, conceptions, opinions and beliefs are 
constituted and fortified, I argue in part, by the dominant intellectual tradition. My work 
will aim to explore a possible linkage between an historical way of thinking of animals as 
lesser-than to one particular outcome of climate change, using an interdisciplinary 
approach. Although there are many factors which have influenced the emergence and 
perpetuation of the livestock sector, I contend that an examination of and reconciliation 
with the conventional understandings of animal minds may be key to addressing animal 
agriculture which is one of many contributors to the climate crisis.  
Despite the continual flux in legal status and public opinion regarding animals and 
their capabilities, philosophers and animal scientists of the 20th and 21st centuries have 
built a body of support for the claim that animals empirically demonstrate sentience, 
meaning the capacity to feel and experience mental states or more generally put, many 
animals exhibit consciousness (Low “Cambridge..”). However, what remains for the most 
part taboo to consider is the possibility that non-human animals can participate in, to 
some extent, the Aristotelian notion of rationality or the capability for deliberation as 
identified in Historia Animalum and more fully elaborated upon in Nicomachean Ethics 
(location 234; pg 41). Deliberation, according to Aristotle, is applied to “the things that 
are brought about by our own efforts, but not always in the same way” (Ethics 41). In this 
view, deliberation is a process by which the means to an end are chosen (Ethics 41). One 
might call this capacity intentionality, executive control or the workings of a rational 
faculty. One might also imagine how the recognition and confirmation of such cognitive 
abilities might complicate the human animal-relationship and pose problems for certain 
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industries wholly reliant upon animal labor. Whereas animal consciousness or sentience 
has been established by the scientific community and has been a centerpiece of ethical 
arguments for animal rights and welfare, animal cognition remains an active area of 
scholarship that is, in some cases, coming to convention challenging conclusions about 
the mental lives of animals. 
In the discipline of philosophy, rationality is most generally described as either 
theoretical or practical (Sosis and Bishop 27). For the purposes of this work, practical 
rationality will be considered when speaking of non-human animal capability. In recent 
years, animal cognition researchers and philosophers have argued that some animals 
demonstrate a capacity for practical rationality (Blaisdell; Buckner). Such a finding 
reliably invites the critique of anthropomorphism or the potentially inaccurate assignment 
of human qualities to animals. In response, others have criticized past models of 
rationality and experimental trends as anthropocentric and thus scientifically inaccurate. 
In light of this tension, I will note here that methodological concerns regarding the 
interpretation of animal behavior remain and complicate the task of studying the thinking 
processes of other beings. Additionally, ethical concerns relating to whether attempts to 
study and describe animal minds violate a basic principle of informed consent remain 
(Menache). In light of these concerns, some researchers have interpreted empirical 
studies from the field of animal cognition in ways that challenge the historical conception 
of animal minds and take issue with the historical presupposition of animals as mindless 
automatons. 
Taking these studies into account, my aim here is to consider how the historical 
denial of cognition, particularly a rational faculty to non-human animals was and 
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continues to be essential to the construction of a relationship between humans and 
animals in which animals are located below humans on a hierarchy of value and also 
defined in oppositional and exclusive relation to humans. Maintaining a conception of 
animal minds as “lesser-than” based on their capacity or lack thereof for rationality, I 
contend, constitutes a logic of domination that promotes unhealthy relationships with 
other animals and may contribute, via the livestock sector, to climate change. 
The Role of Rationality 
Philosophers and scientists over the past few decades have begun to interrogate 
the notion of rationality as the defining human feature by skeptically interrogating the 
presumption that humans are as rational as previously believed and alone in this regard as 
the cognitive capacities of non-human animals are increasingly considered (Stanovich 
2019). Examining the traditional view of animal minds through an ecological feminist 
lens and in light of recent developments in animal studies, the inadequacy and harm in 
using rationality as a qualification for humane treatment emerges. The status of animal 
sentience has long served as justification for animal welfare legislation. Being that the 
capacity for suffering is the cornerstone of animal protection law, there is reason to draw 
a connection between the capacities humans assign to animals and how protected they are 
under the law. Despite the use of sentience as the basis for legal protection, billions of 
animals continue to be slaughtered annually for food in the U.S alone. While the 
knowledge that animals feel and suffer has had some impact on animal welfare (up until 
the point of slaughter), it has not had much of an impact on the growth of the livestock 
sector. Since the 1960s, “Beef production has more than doubled, while over the same 
time chicken meat production has increased by a factor of nearly 10, made up of 
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increases in both number of animals and productivity” (Thornton 2854). In thinking 
about why this might be, BAM seems be important. Considering that, in the West, a great 
deal of value is attributed to the rational faculty, the wholesale denial of our “special” 
kind of cognition to animals may bolster presuppositions which make it difficult for 
humans to empathize with and see value in non-human animals. While animal rationality 
is not and should not be a de jure criterion for respecting the lives of other beings, de 
facto there is reason to think its denial might contribute to a mindset which puts animals 
in the category of edible and humans in the category of non-edible. I aim to assert here 
that learning about animal cognition, not as a prerequisite for treating other animals with 
sovereignty over their bodies, but rather as a vehicle for reconciling a distorted 
conception of animals will strengthen empathic abilities in a way that helps to avoid what 
Gruen has identified as two polarities of empathetic suppression and epistemically 
inaccurate and inappropriate forms of empathy (Entangled 80). One might wonder why 
focus on animal rationality if it ought to be ultimately irrelevant to the way animals are 
treated. My answer to this is fourfold. 1) Learning that some other animals have 
capacities traditionally denied to them serves to emphasize the ambiguity of the 
distinction/demarcation between humans and animals. 2) The study of animal cognition 
and animal rationality in particular is relatively new, dynamic terrain that contests a long 
history of thinking about animals in a hierarchical and inferior manner. 3) The notion of 
humans as the “rational animal” in an Aristotelian sense, is undermined by this analysis. 
4) Given the implications for BAM on human animal interactions, it seems a worthwhile 
pursuit to clarify the capabilities of animal minds. 
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An Interdisciplinary Project 
The interdisciplinary and intersectional field of animal studies connects seemingly 
disparate disciplines with its focus on the historical and contemporary nature of human-
animal relations. Animal studies scholars are interested in exploring questions of 
importance raised by examining the role other animals play in our lives and the way, as 
Donna Haraway says, all conscious beings, wittingly or not, interact in a “knot of species 
co-shaping one another in layers of reciprocating complexity all the way down”(4). 
Within this field, the interconnectivity of living things as part of a larger ecosystem is 
presumed. 
In speaking about animals as if they constitute one broad category, I will commit 
the Derridean error of overgeneralization which arguably contributes to a dualistic 
mentality. As Derrida sharply put it: 
to say “animal” and then put them all into one category, both the monkey and the 
ant is a very violent gesture. To put all living things that aren’t human into one 
category, is first of all, a stupid gesture-theoretically ridiculous-and partakes in 
the very real violence that humans exercise towards animals. (Hiperf428) 
Despite my philosophical agreement with Derrida, for the purposes of readability, I will 
rarely honor his critique. However, when speaking of animals in general, I will instead 
use the term non-human animals when appropriate to bring attention to the fact that 
humans are also animals. 
In my first section, I will outline the conceptual tools borrowed from ecofeminism 
that will be utilized to analyze influential works from the Western tradition. In the second 
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section, I provide an overview of the traditional Western conception through a textual 
analysis of philosophical works. In the third section, I will look at the findings from 
contemporary research within animal cognition looking at rationality and its analogues 
such as theory of mind specifically. In the fourth and final section I will suggest that the 
Western view of animal minds as “non-rational” serves to prop up the livestock sector. In 
the West where GHG emissions, consumer choice and economic power are greater, a 
plant-based and or aspirationally vegan diet will be proposed as a praxis for practicing 
healthier interactions with animals and the biosphere. It is my view that because 
veganism disincentivizes the expansion of animal agriculture, its more widespread 
practice has the potential to both aide in reconstructing relationships between human and 
non-human animals in non-hierarchical, non-dualistic ways and combat climate change.   
From an ecofeminist perspective, I will aim to trace and describe the conception 
of non-human animal minds through the ancient and modern historical periods. I will 
argue a dominant strain of thought in the Western canon has conceived of non-human 
animals as hierarchically inferior and “non-rational.” In light of animal cognition 
research, this view is found to be unscientific in many cases. Furthermore, this 
conception perpetuates a morally problematic human/animal dualism that devalues and 
discards non-human lives at the expense of our biosphere. 
In the interest of establishing the devaluation of animal minds as a historical and 
contemporary dominant Western view, I will 1) engage with ancient and modern 
philosophical texts, drawing on the works of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hobbes, Pope 
and Darwin. 2) Discuss the presence and influence of this view within the field of animal 
cognition, specifically its influence on the debate over ToM and how the influence of this 
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conception has informed critiques of anthropocentrism levied by philosophers Kristen 
Andrews and Cameron Buckner. In order to lend support to my claim that the presence of 
a logic of domination encourages destructive relationships between human and non-
human animals, I will reference psychological research into the belief in animal minds 
(BAM) which posits a linkage between conceptions of non-human animal minds and the 
nature of relationships with other animals in section one.   
To support the notion that a historical conception of animal cognition as hyper-
separate from and inferior to human cognition constitutes a logic of domination, I will 
apply the ecological feminist constructs of value hierarchy and value dualism to the 
aforementioned ancient and modern thinkers in section two and to the debate over ToM 
in section three. In section four, I will support my claim that the livestock sector, as one 
of the most significant contributors to climate change, is a representative manifestation of 
this historical conception of animal minds as lesser than by analyzing data from FAO and 
IPCC’s Global Warming of 1.5ºC report through the lens of ecofeminism. Based on my 
research, I will recommend a shift to a plant based, aspirationally vegan diet as ecological 
feminist praxis in the reconstruction of a healthier relationship with other animals and the 
biosphere.   
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Section 1  
Ecofeminism as Theoretical Approach 
Much of the problem (both for women and nature) lies in rationalist or rationalist-
derived conceptions of self and of what is essential and valuable in the human 
makeup. It is in the name of such a reason that these other things- The feminine, 
the emotional, the merely bodily, or the merely animal and the natural world itself 
- have most often been denied their virtue and been accorded an inferior and 
merely instrumental position. 
 — Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature 
  Ecological feminism is rich in conceptual resources which, when applied to issues 
in animal studies, work to clarify and contextualize the conventional wisdom of Western 
philosophy and science. Ecofeminists labor to reveal the connections between the 
oppressions of women and nature through various constructs. The breadth and depth of 
ecofeminist thought is expansive and by no means monolithic. Scholars in this field have 
developed a plurality of perspectives from which to examine literature, media, language, 
ethical systems etc. While I will draw from critical perspectives within ecofeminist 
literature throughout this work, special indebtedness is owed to the critique of the 
rationalist tradition, articulated by Val Plumwood. Additionally, the theoretical constructs 
of value-hierarchical thinking, oppositional value dualism and a logic of 
colonization/domination, as developed by Val Plumwood, Vandana Shiva and Karen 
Warren will be instrumental to the textual analysis in section two. I will utilize these 
concepts to emphasize how animals have been relegated to a lower rung of the existential 
ladder and argue that the nature/culture dualism found in classic Western texts maintains 
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this subjugation through the use of a logic of domination to justify oppressive 
stratification between humans and non-human animals. Additionally, Lori Gruen’s 
entangled empathy model will be relied on as a care-based ethic to argue for a move 
away from the cultural value of rationality as a defining feature of humanity. 
I am interested in carrying out a critique of the Western literature and particularly 
examining the concept of scale naturae which has firmly situated animal lives on the 
hierarchical framework as at best “non-rational” and at worst mechanical. I agree in this 
work with Plumwood that “Rationalism is the key to the connected oppressions of 
women and nature in the West” and increasingly think ecofeminist analysis coupled with 
animal cognition research and the looming threat of climate change offers a formidable 
challenge to the human/nature dualism. My analysis will stem from Plumwood’s 
assessment with a focus on non-human animals. Looking at historical notions of 
rationality, the Western view of non-human animals will be examined to better 
understand the conceptual mechanisms which have enabled the large-scale exploitation of 
other animals. 
Across the ages, a dominant strand in Western literature has encouraged a kind of 
hierarchical thinking that has led to a permissive attitude towards animal domination. 
Hierarchies are not inherently oppressive, rather, it is distinctive qualities that lead a 
hierarchy to become oppressive. Hierarchies can be useful for organizing information or 
preventing harm such as in the case of a teacher exercising control over her classroom 
(Warren 256). Hierarchies take on an oppressive characteristic when the logic of 
domination is then applied to the disjunctive relationship. A distinction is drawn in 
ecofeminist literature and in this work between oppressive hierarchies and other kinds 
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which serve a protective rather than subordinating purpose. Early traces of value 
hierarchical thinking are found in Plato’s Phaedrus and Aristotle’s Historia Animalium. 
Plato's ranking of human souls as in the Phaedrus is a formative example of the tendency 
to rank life. In this work, Plato constructs the allegory of the chariot which delineates the 
various rankings of human beings depending on the degree of their fall. Value-
hierarchical thinking can also be found by examining Historia Animālium in which 
Aristotle describes a version of the great chain of being (scala naturae). To use a term 
coined by Ariel Salleh, this type of thinking is still in “the capitalist unconscious.” 
According to Salleh, the hegemonic unconscious is “this kind of hierarchization where 
power belongs at the top and is exercised down. Everything below the line, in the sphere 
of nature is treated as a resource. That’s the underbelly of everyday assumptions we are 
trying to change” (Risaliti). In section two, I will focus my analysis on works that 
promote oppressive value hierarchies. Critiquing a rationalist culture also requires us to 
look for the presence of oppositional value dualisms. 
An oppressive conceptual framework promotes oppositional value dualisms or 
binaries which place value on one end and deny value on the other. Some of the 
oppositional value dualisms I will be interested in exploring in this work are, 
human/animal, culture/nature, rational/non-rational. Particular attention will be paid to 
the rational/non-rational dualism in light of developments within animal behavioral 
science. An understanding of how the rational/non-rational disjunction was constituted 
will be sought through an analysis of Aristotle's idea that human beings solely have a 
rational principle or the ability to carry out rationally formulated projects as articulated in 
his Nicomachean Ethics. Ecofeminism provides a methodological approach for 
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deconstructing dualisms by focusing on the following guidelines. As Plumwood detailed 
in Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, the concept of dualism is constituted by many 
factors such as backgrounding, instrumentalizing, denial of dependency, and radical 
exclusion among others (Plumwood 2015). Part of confronting the Western literature is 
recognizing that non-human animals are backgrounded. Ancient thinkers tended to 
appreciate other animals without fully acknowledging the dynamic as a relationship. 
Ecofeminism can help us reflect on our tortured relationship with other members of the 
ecosystem, reassess and move forward in our relationships with other creatures. In the 
face of an anthropogenic climate crisis in significant part fueled by greenhouse gas 
emissions from the livestock sector, examining these relationships will be critical. Paying 
attention to how non-human animals are conceptually regarded has implications for 
humans and non-humans alike. 
Embracing an Alternative Ethic 
An ethic that will guide this work is derived from Gruen’s entangled empathy 
model of interacting with other beings. Gruen’s ethic is aligned with a non-hierarchical 
concept of difference and will illuminate, when applied to the problem of animal 
agriculture, diet and climate change, one route forward. Operating on the premise that 
humans already are in relationships with other animals, Gruen circumvents narrow ‘us 
versus them’ narratives perpetuated by the classical binaries (humans versus non-
humans) (rational versus non-rational). Gruen identifies the human dynamic with other 
animals as a relationship as opposed to a transaction or burden or some other 
dispassionate exchange and in doing so, makes room for reflection and examination. In 
describing the human/non-human animal dynamic as a relationship, Gruen challenges her 
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reader to question the quality of these relationships. Furthermore, Gruen, shifts 
responsibility away from laypersons to those with the most expertise and/or familiarity 
with the harmed party (non-human animals). Gruen adopts a social justice framework and 
vocabulary to understand those we are in relationships with that we do not fully 
understand or that we may have difficulty empathizing with noting “When certain 
features of a situation are taken as given, when the background conditions that led to the 
moral problem are overlooked, certain potential solutions are overlooked” (9). I agree 
here with Gruen and argue one of the features of the current non-human animal situation 
is the presumption that animals are hierarchically different and included in that 
assessment is the charge of being nonrational. This belief that all non-human animals lack 
a rational faculty stems from a long line of thought that has promoted rationality as an 
exclusive feature of humanity. Paying attention to this particular feature of rationality 
may make way for possible solutions that were not available to what Gruen refers to as 
the “moral imagination” (Entangled 10). The current logic regarding non-human animals 
as I see it is as follows: If humans are the only rational creatures and it is okay to mistreat 
or harm any creature that does not think precisely like a human, then one should not be 
surprised to find there is a general lack of recognition of interconnectivity or 
entanglement. The reconsideration of what it means to be a rational animal may allow for 
the kind of empathetic surge Gruen advocates for. This work will be in line with the 
entangled empathy model proposed by Gruen that says learning more about capabilities 
not only undermines the traditional view of animals as hierarchically less than and 
categorically separate from human, it also can facilitate our empathetic instinct when 
studies are conducted in an ethical manner. 
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Belief in Animal Mind (BAM) 
The notion that learning about animal capabilities and cognition in particular can 
impact empathy is not just theoretical. A research area has emerged to study the 
psychology behind human relationships with other animals. Belief in Animal Mind 
(BAM) is a subfield of psychology that aims to explore the relationship between what 
humans report they think about the cognitive abilities of other animals and the usage and 
status of those animals in society. The studies conducted in this area have generated 
interesting data pertaining to the relationships between people and animals. Researchers 
have noted the discrepancy between public perception and scientific understandings of 
animal capabilities (Spence; Maust-Mohl). It has also been noted in the literature that in 
order to resolve the dissonance between empathetic inclination toward animals and meat 
eating, a phenomenon known as the “meat paradox,” the mental capacities of animals 
used for food purposes are frequently devalued (Bastian). In consideration of research on 
human perceptions of animal mind, this work will reflect on the potential for BAM to 
have implications for animal welfare and beyond. 
Avoiding Uncritical Equality   
According to Gruen, one problem for traditional ethical theories such as those of 
Regan and Singer is their emphasis on doing away with morally significant difference. In 
agreement with Gruen and other ecofeminists, there is a danger in focusing on sameness. 
However, in my view, the Western tradition overemphasizes distinction and difference 
and when inappropriate, these distortions must be addressed. My interest in describing 
the shared qualities of rationality between humans and some non-human animals is not to 
reinforce sameness but rather to reconstruct a conception of rationality to account for 
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similarities and differences as they arise. In doing this, humans may learn some things 
that change the nature of relationships with non-human animals from backgrounded 
passive supporting characters who only serve to bolster the human narrative to beings 
with agency and cognition. With my theoretical posture outlined, I turn to look at the 
various ways the Western conception of animal minds and classical model of rationality 
as an exclusive feature of humanity is dualistic, hierarchical and contributes to the 
construction of a logic of domination.  
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Section 2 
Sketching the Western Conception of Animals  
Rationality has perennially been held as the exclusive and defining feature of 
humanity. While a consensus that rationality alone can distinguish “man from beast” 
exists amongst many of the most influential Western philosophers, not all have defined 
rationality in the same terms. Despite the plurality of descriptions for what constitutes 
rationality, ancient and modern philosophical thinkers have consistently made one thing 
clear, non-human animals do not have it. In reviewing texts which refer to animal-kind 
spanning the transition from Aristotle to Darwin, a general view of animals as cognitively 
inferior was constructed and maintained. Through an exposition of excerpts pertaining to 
animals and their capacity for rationality, I will aim to sketch the dominant Western view 
through the ancient and modern periods. 
Classical Conceptions 
Due to the abundant use of animals as metaphorical and allegorical tools in 
ancient texts, one might assume non-human animals to be held in high regard. Animals 
have served not only as literal but also figurative beasts of burden, bearing at different 
times the most revered and reviled traits projected onto them by human kind. The ancient 
Western dialogue about humans and animals is characterized by a literary codependency 
with animals often serving as devices for the articulation of some slippery quality in 
human nature. Some passages leave the impression that animals are genuinely admired 
for displaying virtuous qualities. In other selections, animals serve as vessels for less than 
ideal qualities. For an animal to be praised here and there for some capability deemed 
important or valuable in the works of Plato and Aristotle belies how animals were 
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regarded overall in their writings as fundamentally inferior. Putting passing 
commendations into a larger context, animals often serve an instrumental rather than 
agentic purpose. While Plato and Aristotle are quick to point out the many qualities 
animals appear to demonstrate in great resemblance to humans, there is a clear line drawn 
when discussion turns to reason and rationality or logos in the Greek. It is on this subject 
of logos that a hierarchy and duality between rational/non-rational begins to form. This 
early denial of reason to animals is a part of a larger project of defining by contrast the 
human condition to the point of an irreducible primary. The ability to reason or 
possession of a rational faculty was expressed through Plato’s dialogues and by Aristotle 
as that which sets man apart. Consequently, rationality or the capacity to reason became 
imbued with a weight of import that continued to accumulate over time, giving advantage 
to the only species thought to display it, namely human beings. Traces of a cognitive 
hierarchy can be read in the earliest Platonic and Aristotelian writings and are reiterated 
through the pages of the great books with rare exception. This value is detected in Plato’s 
description of the tripartite soul and in Aristotle’s discussion of soul in De Anima. Plato’s 
comments about animal cognition in his Republic and Phaedrus provide formative 
examples of a tendency to rank beings. A view of animals as hierarchically inferior, 
instrumental, and ultimately lacking the ability to reason will be established through a 
review of Plato’s Republic and Phaedrus and Aristotle’s Historia Animalum and De 
Anima. 
Through a discussion about animal enslavement, a hierarchy is established along 
with a culture/nature dualism in Plato’s seminal work, the Republic. The notion that 
animal enslavement necessarily preserves democracy is asserted. In this dialogue, 
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Socrates makes a parallel between the tripartite soul and the class system. Within this 
system, the guardians are associated with being reasonable, the middle class or auxiliaries 
spirited and the lower classes, appetitive. Through Socratic dialogue, an ideally balanced 
society is described. In part two, chapter three, Socrates and Glaucon discuss the qualities 
that guardians should possess. They agree that Guardians should have a “philosophic 
disposition” (loc. 1817). To illustrate this point, an animal is used to metaphorically 
represent character traits thought be rare in humans but common in animals. Socrates 
makes the general observation that “there are natures which combine the qualities we 
thought incompatible” and they are to be “found in different kinds of animal” (loc.1798). 
Identifying the watch-dog as a vessel for the qualities formerly thought to be mutually 
exclusive (spirited and gentle) Socrates adds that a “well bred watch-dog” has the 
disposition of a philosopher (Republic loc. 1777). When Glaucon questions his meaning, 
Socrates explains how watch-dogs have the keen ability to “distinguish the sight of friend 
and foe simply by knowing one and not knowing the other. And a creature that 
distinguishes between the familiar and the unfamiliar on the grounds of knowledge or 
ignorance must surely be gifted with a real love of knowledge” (Republic loc 1814). 
While the watch-dog is praised here for exhibiting prized qualities that might indicate 
possession of more than a perceptual nature, this does not gain watch-dogs a higher 
placement on the value hierarchy. The watchdog is used here instrumentally to illustrate 
the master’s end. In a mechanism that will be observed again, animals are recognized for 
certain admirable traits, traits that would qualify them to participate in a mental life 
beyond basic perception, yet time and again, this is done for the use of a human aim. As 
Plumwood describes in a chapter on the logic of colonization, the undervalued 
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constituent (animal) “has no such intrinsic value, is not for-itself but merely useful, a 
resource” and as such is beyond the moral realm (Feminism and Mastery 53). 
In chapter eight of Republic, Socrates makes clear where animal kind ranks in his society. 
In beginning the dialogue, Socrates makes an analogy between oligarchy and democracy 
to illustrate how excess gives rise to tyranny. Socrates says that money is to oligarchy as 
liberty is to democracy and either in excess will lead to tyranny. An excess of liberty 
results in an anarchy that can infect “even domestic animals” (loc 6091). Socrates muses 
to his interlocutors about the dangers of a classless society, making a slippery slope 
argument that he should see how animals have a “grand freedom” that even “horses and 
donkeys” are free to roam the streets with little regard or courtesy for any human 
passerby in democracy (loc. 6094). In Socrates’ view, animal liberty of the kind just 
described is a corrupting force in a democracy. Likewise, a similar notion of animals as 
necessarily subjugated is presented, in a passive, but nevertheless important way in 
Phaedrus.   
As part of the larger thematic conversation between Phaedrus and Socrates over 
the question of whether the non-lover is superior to the lover, Socrates narrates a “proof” 
for the notion that love is sent by the gods in the form of madness (loc. 292). Within the 
confines of this dialogue, Socrates articulates the Allegory of the Chariot to illustrate 
Plato’s theory of the tripartite soul. To illuminate “the nature of the soul” Socrates 
proceeds to illustrate the soul as represented by a chariot driven by two winged horses 
(loc. 291). The horse on the right is described as “moderate, modest and inclined to be 
reasonable” (loc.413). The horse on the right is also intelligent in the sense that he “is 
guided by words and commands” (loc 413). The animals in this metaphor serve as 
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vehicles for Plato’s philosophy. Although the horse on the right is praised for its more 
desirable nature it serves merely an instrumental purpose. The regard for animals as 
resources rather than subjects is made clear when the horse on the left begins to disobey 
the chariot driver. Reason in this metaphor literally and violently forces the appetitive 
horse to submit, “Drawing back as if from a starting-rope, the driver rips the bit out of the 
teeth of the violent horse even more forcefully than before and covers its tongue and jaws 
with blood, forcing its haunches to the ground as punishment” (Phaedrus loc.437). In this 
passage, the animals represented by the two horses are subjugated while humans, 
represented by the chariot driver, are elevated in a value hierarchy. Not only is the notion 
of reason and its role as subjugator of the other capabilities indicative of the significance 
of reason as an assumed feature of the ruling class, it also is suggestive of a kind of 
justificatory and permissive attitude towards violence against those deemed to lack a 
rational faculty. Plato’s description of metempsychosis through Phaedrus provides an 
early hierarchy for understanding the status of “wild animals” (loc. 352). Reading further 
into Phaedrus and the system of metempsychosis, one learns that a soul that has not 
witnessed truth (grasped by the rational faculty) cannot take the human form. In the 
elaborate schema of metempsychosis, souls are reincarnated according to how much truth 
they have seen during the procession of charioteers. Socrates during his speech explains 
that the laws of this system dictate that animals receive second hand souls, stating: “Any 
soul that is unable to follow, cannot see what is true, and has the misfortune of forgetting 
what is essential so that it is filled with sloth, then it grows heavy, loses its wings and 
sinks to earth” (loc. 339). The laws of metempsychosis further stipulate that such a soul 
will be planted into a human being, not into a wild animal, as its first incarnation 
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(Phaedrus 339). However, after one lifecycle, two groups emerge: those who have lived 
justly and those who have lived unjustly. The unjust are punished in the underworld and 
the just rise up to the heavens. After one thousand years, the just and unjust souls gather 
to “draw lots” and it is at this point that “a human soul may enter a wild animal, or a soul 
that was formerly human may again become human” (Phaedrus loc. 351). In a revealing 
stipulation, “a soul that has never seen the truth cannot attain human form” (352). By 
default, animals must receive the souls that have not seen the truth and have lived an 
unjust first life. Animal souls, one could infer, are doubly flawed in that they are the 
leftover souls of the unjust and unenlightened. Socrates critically distinguishes human 
reasoning in saying “to be human, one must be able to understand and articulate a form 
that integrates many perceptions and grasps them through the power of reason. In this 
way, humans recollect what our soul once beheld when it followed a god, transcend the 
things we now consider to exist, and saw reality itself” (Phaedrus Loc. 354). From this 
passage, a sense of the Platonic hierarchy, necessitating animals receive the imperfect, 
once briefly but inadequately human souls, is gained. Animals are, by systematic design, 
assigned second class souls. When Plato makes rationality a part of the soul and then 
makes a soul that has preserved its rational faculty mutually exclusive from animal kind, 
he is placing non-human animals on a lower rung of an existential hierarchy. In the 
aforementioned Platonic texts, one finds the idea of hierarchical thinking about animals 
as necessarily lacking rationality and hierarchically inferior. The visions presented by 
Plato informed conventional wisdom about the “natural” order of things. While both 
cases are early forms of hierarchical thinking, they nevertheless set a precedent for how 
animals will be perceived in subsequent ages. 
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Remarkably, Aristotle included humans in the category of animals. He also did 
not shy away from bestowing the quality of intelligence upon many creatures including 
cranes who he assessed had “high intelligence” (loc.6291). However, reason is reserved 
for man alone. Aristotle built upon his teacher’s view of animals and rationality as 
mutually exclusive. Based on observations of the natural world, Aristotle identified 
reason or a “rational principle” as the most significant demarcation between humans and 
all other species. Additionally, Aristotle’s descriptions and classifications of animals laid 
the foundation for the medieval concept of scala naturae or The Great Chain of Being. 
Although no direct textual reference is made, the concept of scala naturae emerges from 
Aristotle’s categorization of life in Historia Animālium and a description of soul in 
Nicomachean Ethics. 
In book one of Historia Animalum Aristotle makes several comparisons between 
humans and other animals. Regarding physiology, Aristotle notes that “Man is the only, 
or nearly the only, creature, that has eyes of diverse colours” claiming “Animals, as a 
rule, have eyes of one colour only” (loc. 448). In regard to character, Aristotle noted 
differences he considered to be exceptional to “man alone” (loc. 234). The qualities 
observed are significant to this discussion as they can be considered precursors or part 
and parcel to a rational faculty. The first quality Aristotle brings attention to is 
deliberation stating, “But of all animals man alone is capable of deliberation” (Historia 
234). The second quality thought by Aristotle to be held by “man alone” is memory. 
Aristotle observes in Historia Animalum that “Many animals have memory, and are 
capable of instruction; but no other creature except man can recall the past at will” (loc. 
236). As I will touch on in section three, these qualities are linked to an ability to reason 
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or more generally demonstrate cognitive executive control. Their denial works to 
establish animal cognition as lesser than and opposed to human cognition. In the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle sets out in book one in part to determine what is “peculiar 
to man” (13). Aristotle quickly rules out life as a distinct function of man because this, he 
acknowledges is “common even to the plants” (13). Aristotle moves on to perception, and 
once again, determines that perception is “common even to the horse, the ox, and every 
animal” (14). After ruling out these other possibilities, Aristotle postulates that “There 
remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle; of this, one part 
has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of 
possessing one and exercising thought. And, as “life of the rational element” also has two 
meanings, we must state that life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems 
to be the more proper sense of the term” (14). In considering this rational principle as the 
function of man, Aristotle is precluding other animals from participating in it. While 
Aristotle brought much attention to the lives of animals, his distinction between humans 
and animals has had a lasting influence on the perception of animal minds as lacking a 
rational capability. 
Modern Conceptions 
In the modern period, while animals enjoyed more direct praise for their abilities, 
they continued to be counted as non-rational creatures. They also continued to be utilized 
in literature for the purpose of describing some yet undefined feature or nature. By 
continuing to define animals as “non-rational” creatures, modern philosopher perpetuated 
a hierarchical view of animals as lesser than and dualistically other. Rene Descartes 
described animal cognition in stark and now infamous terms in his Discourse. In this 
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work, Descartes defined reason as “the power of judging aright and of distinguishing 
truth from error, which is properly what is called good sense or reason” (5). Descartes 
noted the physical similarities between humans and animals reflecting upon his 
vivisections that, in regard to physiological structures, the “animals, void of reason may 
be said to wholly resemble us” (38). Despite this admittance of physical commonalities, a 
rational principle was viewed by Descartes as a function of the soul which he came to 
belief was “annexed” to the human body by god (38). In addition to a rational capacity 
being a function of the soul, Descartes viewed it as something belonging only to humans. 
In listing the qualities of good sense, Descartes notes three features which contribute to 
the “perfection of the mind” and then remarks that reason or sense alone is what 
“distinguishes us from the brutes” (5). Descartes asserts that language is the key reason 
why animals cannot be rational. He writes that non-human animals lack the ability to 
appropriately and meaningfully communicate their thoughts, which he claims to be a 
necessary quality of rational beings (46). Even when non-human animals are capable of 
imitating speech, such as in the case of parrots, because they cannot react to every 
situation in a thoughtful way, it is impossible to know they are not automata. This 
disturbing conclusion that animals are mere automata or “moving machines” served to 
devalue the lives of animals. The links Descartes makes between language and rationality 
and language and living systems continued to exert great influence into the 20th century. 
Interestingly, it is advancements in computer technology that have in part informed 
notions of the kind of languageless rationality that I will consider in section four.   
Looking at Hobbes’s view of rationality, one finds an appreciation for what animals 
accomplish. Hobbes reinforces the belief that due to the lack of language; animals are not 
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able to engage in reasoning. While the catalyst for reason has shifted away from a 
conversation about souls, animals are still placed in a lesser category due in part to them 
being deemed languageless by Hobbes. Although Hobbes’ account of human nature 
provides a definition of rationality which is more in harmony at times with non-human 
than human behavior, Hobbes, in no uncertain terms, denies a rational capacity to non-
human animals. Hobbes lays down his fundamental law of human nature, “a precept or 
general rule of reason,” which is “that everyman ought to endeavor peace as farre as he 
has hope of attaining it, and when he cannot attain it, that he may seek and use all helps, 
and advantages of warre”(Hobbes 59). According to this law of rational human nature, 
humans should pursue war only after all efforts for peace have failed and only in the 
interest of self-preservation. Hobbes’ second law, that rational persons should adhere to is 
a version of the Golden Rule, “whatsoever you require that others do to you, that you do 
ye to them” (59). Between these two rules, a solid foundation was built for rational action 
against which non-human animal behavior can be compared. The opportunity for 
comparison presents itself when Hobbes explains why “certain creatures without reason, 
or speech nevertheless live in society, without any coercive power” (80). Taking ants and 
bees as examples, Hobbes observes these creatures live naturally in a sociable manner 
and this quality can be attributed to their "non-rational". The penchant for peaceable 
relations found among irrational creatures, he argues, is in part the result of a lack of 
speech which makes them incapable of deceiving one another by representing “that 
which is good, in the likenesse of Evill; and Evill, in the likenesse of Good;” and 
“discontenting men, and troubling their peace at their pleasure” (Hobbes 81). The 
capacity for speech is significant to Hobbes and he links it intimately with rational 
26 
 
thought at the beginning of his work. However, the use of speech in this way as a tool of 
deception explicitly violates his stated rational laws of nature to seek peace unless one’s 
life is in danger and to do onto others as you would have them do onto you. In this sense, 
the power of language is not solely aligned with rationality and its absence allows non-
human animals to behave according to the dictates of natural law which are based on 
reason. Considering the parallels between what Hobbes claims to be rational behavior 
and what he observes in non-human animals, to present the two as mutually exclusive 
proves inconsistent within his model for rational behavior but does speak to an ingrained 
view of animals as necessarily different in a fundamental way. This difference, as Hobbes 
make clear is predicated on a lack of rationality and its related features such as curiosity 
and what he calls “reckoning” “(that is, adding and subtracting) of the consequences of 
general names agreed upon, for the marking and signifying of our thoughts” (14). Hobbes 
draws the distinction between humans and animals in defining curiosity as the following: 
Desire, to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no living creature but 
Man; so that Man is distinguished, not onely by his Reason; but also by this 
singular Passion from other Animals; in whom the appetite of food, and other 
pleasures of Sense, by praedominance, take away the care of knowing causes; 
which is a Lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continuall and 
indefatigable generation of Knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any 
carnall Pleasure. (Hobbes 22) 
Hobbes was one of many modern thinkers to affirm the ancient view of animals as 
lacking in rationality. His utilization of animals to illustrate a point about human 
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distinction serves to cast animals as dualistically opposed to humans, for better or for 
worse.    
A hierarchical ordering of life is found in Alexander Pope’s Poem Essay on Man. 
In Pope’s view, rationality is the exclusive power of man and the product of a divinely 
ordered world in which all beings are in “exact proportion to the state; Nothing to add, 
and nothing to abate” (Essay 185). Pope, in articulating his hierarchical worldview, 
places human beings above animals in the “vast chain of being” due to their god given 
power of rationality. He predicates this rationality on the understanding of this order in 
saying “Shall he alone, whom rational we call, be pleased with nothing if not blessed 
with all” (Essay 187). The implication being, one who is not pleased with anything if not 
blessed with all is acting in a manner inconsistent with rationality. Pope is poking fun 
here at the observed tendency in human nature for hubris. As he describes, mankind 
wants “the strength of bulls, the fur of bears,” or more than should be reasonably desired 
(Essay 182). Other creatures, in contrast, seem to be content in their position, “each beast, 
each insect, happy in its own” because pride does not interfere. Here, as in Leviathan, 
pride is a human construct which can result in maladaptive emotions such as rage 
according to Hobbes and Hubris according to Pope. If playing one’s part, according to 
one’s nature, is the standard for rationality, and non-human animals more readily accept 
their position, Pope could be interpreted as suggesting that non-human animals can be 
considered rational actors in a world determined by providence. However, as seen before, 
animals are used merely instrumentally in order to reflect some formerly obscured human 
quality or nature. In the context of Pope’s work, that feature is hubris. Another standard 
of reason held by Pope in Essay on Man, which non-human animals seem to meet more 
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readily than human kind, is the respect for nature’s interdependence and 
interconnectedness. Pope gives great credit to other creatures for their propensity to live 
harmoniously within the natural world. The spider for example, whose fine touch “feels 
at each thread and lives along the line” does so naturally without resistance or desire to 
play more than a small role in the grand scheme of nature (199). Man, in contrast, must 
be reminded that in the great chain of nature, every link serves the purpose of 
contributing to a holistic balance. But mankind, Pope thinks, is always questioning its 
interdependence on other links in “Nature’s chain” (201). The cause of such folly is 
pride, from which Pope wrote “our very reason springs” and paradoxically “our error 
lies” (174, 160). While it seems at first that Pope is saying pride is a necessary condition 
for rationality, he clarifies that pride is the result of poor reasoning. When judging moral 
and natural things, “In both to reason right is to submit” (174). In the sense that 
submission indicates proper reasoning, non-human animals are in accordance whereas 
humans have gone astray. If man can act irrationally in his misguided ambition to “act 
and think beyond mankind” and mistreats the beings upon which he is dependent and still 
can be considered a wholly rational creature, non-human animals should, in all fairness 
be considered to possess some degree of rationality (Essay 188). Rational purity would 
have to be a requirement to exclude non-human animal kind from the spectrum of 
rationality and since it seems humans act at times in irrational ways, limiting the label of 
rationality to only human beings seems inconsistent. Despite Pope’s recognition of virtue 
in animal behavior, Pope maintains the social order although arguably regards it 
skeptically.   
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         In a short essay written for The Guardian newspaper, Pope makes an observation 
similar to the one found in Essay on Man about non-human animal nature as opposed to 
human nature. In Against Barbarity to Animals, Pope emphasizes the irrationality of man 
when compared with other creatures. From Pope’s perspective, creatures which have the 
capacity to do great damage, generally avoid mankind and only do harm when provoked 
by necessity of hunger (Pope 260- 261). In this sense, non-human animals adhere to 
Hobbes first law of nature. Man, in stark contrast, does not act in accordance with 
Hobbesian natural law in that he actively “seeks out and pursues even the most 
inoffensive animals on purpose to persecute and destroy them” (Against 261). Despite 
these recognitions of seemingly rational behavior, Pope never explicitly questions the 
nature of animals as anything more than non-rational. Such behavior on the part of 
humans does not conform to God’s law as expressed in Essay on Man. In both works, 
Pope does not deny the right to consume flesh but rather shines a critical light on the 
senseless way in which non-human animal flesh is consumed. Humans should instead, he 
advises, “find it hard to vindicate the destroying of anything that has life, merely out of 
wantonness” (261). Pope characterizes the wantonness human beings display in their 
treatment of non-human animals as “ignorant barbarity” (261). Some non-human 
animals, he laments, are unfortunately regarded as “common enemies” for “no manner of 
reason” (261). While Pope categorically denies other creatures’ status as rational beings, 
his representation of non-human animal behavior suggests a greater aptitude for 
reasonable behavior towards living beings than their human counterparts. Despite this 
presentation, nature’s chain remains intact throughout the modern era. 
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A survey of modern philosophical thought reveals rationality is determined relatively by 
a philosopher’s values. Rationality as described in Leviathan consisted in adherence to 
natural laws. Essay on Man presented rational behavior as consistent with an acceptance 
of one’s God given abilities without hubris and a respectful regard for the 
interdependency of all beings. Additionally, the wanton cruelty towards non-human 
animals as an irrational act of ignorance was condemned in “Against Barbarity to 
Animals.” Although non-human animals are recognized as exhibiting behavior more 
consistent with reason than their human counterparts in certain cases, they are not 
considered by Hobbes or Pope to have any capacity beyond basic perception. Despite a 
Cartesian model that overestimates human speech as an indicator of rationality and 
underestimates the human capacity for inappropriate and meaningless speech and 
behavior, non-human animals demonstrate through their actions the ability to act in ways 
that conform to our understanding of reasonable behavior. However, they are not 
afforded participation in the realm of rationality. 
In The Descent of Man, Charles Darwin imagined the “anthropomorphous ape,” a 
fictional being that could reflect on and communicate the inherent cognitive limitations of 
his own species. Darwin imagined such a creature would take stock of lower abilities 
such as using “stones for fighting or for breaking open nuts” but confess the inability to 
“follow a train of metaphysical reasoning or solve a mathematical problem” (location 
2385). Darwin's use of personification to express his own ideas about the gap between 
human and other animal minds is an important preface to his often quoted statement: “the 
difference in mind between man and the higher animals, as great as it is, is certainly one 
of degree and not of kind” (location 2393). With Darwin’s meaning in mind, I will turn in 
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the next section to a discussion about the empirically studied similarities and differences 
between humans and animals in an effort to juxtapose the classical with the contemporary 
view and show how the traditional denial of animal cognition continues to influence 
contemporary disciplines within animals studies.  
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Section 3 
Scientific Conceptions of Animal Minds 
In no case is an animal activity to be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of 
one which stands lower in the psychological scale. 
— C. Lloyd Morgan, An Introduction to Comparative Psychology  
Since ancient times, the meaning of rationality has undergone significant 
refinement. As the conception of mind transitioned from an immaterial substance located 
in the soul to a materially based emergent property of the brain, an understanding of what 
it means to be rational shifted. Despite this shift, the study of animal cognition continues 
to reflect a Western mindset characterized by a human/nature dualism. As reviewed in the 
previous section, much of the historical discourse surrounding rationality has taken place 
in binary terms. This constructed rational/non-rational binary has led to a kind of all or 
nothing thinking which radically excludes animals from the culturally valuable quality of 
rationality. As animals were studied more systematically in the early modern era, the 
criticism of anthropomorphism was levied. In 1894 the British zoologist and psychologist 
C. Lloyd Morgan published An Introduction to Comparative Psychology in which he 
wrote about the minds of non-human others and cautioned against the propensity of 
anecdotal and observational methods in the nascent field of comparative psychology. A 
narrow interpretation and iteration of the law of parsimony, his canon states that “In no 
case is an animal activity to be interpreted in terms of higher psychological processes if it 
can be fairly interpreted in terms of processes which stand lower in the scale of 
psychological evolution and development” (Morgan 81). Based upon the conclusions of a 
large segment of animal cognition researchers, comparative psychology into the present 
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day seems to be still guided by his precept. While Morgan’s canon was intended to be a 
safeguard against anthropomorphism, Morgan clarified that his canon was not intended to 
preclude animals from higher functions stating, “the canon, by no means excludes the 
interpretation of a particular activity in terms of the higher processes, if we already have 
independent evidence of the occurrence of these higher processes in the animal under 
observation” (59). Within the field of comparative psychology, of which animal 
cognition studies is a subfield, some researchers in the recent past have been hesitant to 
describe animal behavior in mentalistic terms. Others have found purely associative 
behavioristic explanations inadequate. While the conservatism within the sciences 
regarding the cognitive upper limits of animal minds is not entirely inappropriate, some 
have argued it reflects, rather ironically, anthropocentric bias (Buckner 2013, Andrews 
2005). A paradox exists within this field for if one is to interpret animal behavior in terms 
of human behavior one is accused of anthropomorphism but if one refuses to interpret 
animal behavior in terms of human standards one may be acting with an anthropocentric 
bias against other animals. A divide has formed between those who maintain the dualistic 
distinction of mentalistic/behavioristic and those who are beginning to question its 
usefulness and accuracy. While some researchers have embraced a more inclusive 
approach to understanding non-human animal minds, seeing rationality and animals not 
as mutually exclusive, the study of animal cognition, while advanced in many ways, 
continues to reflect the traditional Western view of animals as part of the “inferiorized 
other” through an apparent adherence to a hierarchical view articulated in Morgan’s 
Canon and through a largely anthropocentric experimental paradigm (Plumwood 49). The 
rational/non-rational dualism plays out in a few subfields of animal cognition most 
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notably in studies of theory of mind (ToM) and executive function. The purpose of 
exploring the way animal minds are studied is not to deny difference but rather to reveal 
how a presumed difference may be distorted and the basis of a socially constructed 
relationship characterized by domination. Some of the findings in this area of animal 
cognition research undermine the traditional Western conception and raise interesting 
questions about what it means to maintain a view of non-human animals as necessarily 
non-rational creatures. In what follows, I will define ToM as it is currently understood 
within the scientific community, explain the development of the debate over ToM and 
describe how it reflects a tension created by the traditional view of animal minds as 
inferiorized other. 
Theory of Mind as Microcosm 
The investigation into the capacities of other animals has manifested into a major 
scientific enterprise. One inroad researchers have used to better understand the minds of 
other animals is to explore and test out the question of whether animals have what is 
called in the cognitive sciences ToM, a cognitive skill involved in “social reasoning” 
(Vaart 336).Theory of mind refers to the developmental point in which “children come to 
understand their own and others' minds” (Carlson 1). While a relatively firm concept 
when applied to human beings, its usefulness as a conceptual tool for assessing the 
capacity for “mind reading” in other animals is still a controversial one. Some researchers 
think chimpanzees for example are capable at most of sophisticated behavioral 
abstraction (Povinelli and Vonk 2003). Others think that animals have at least some of 
the basic capacities for ToM (Krupenye 113). In ToM studies, a divide has formed 
between mental and behavioral mental systems. 
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Long believed to be an exclusively human capacity, researchers since the late 
1970s have wondered whether our great ape relatives might share the capacity for “mind 
reading” and whether this could be demonstrated in a laboratory setting. ToM is 
considered a potential capacity that emerges in neurotypical human children around the 
ages of four and five. Premack and Woodruff were the first researchers to apply ToM to 
the study of animals. In their landmark study, “Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of 
Mind,” Woodruff and Premack defined ToM as an individual’s ability “to impute[] 
mental states to himself and others” (515). These mental states might include “purpose or 
intention, as well as knowledge, belief, thinking, doubt, guessing, pretending, liking, and 
so forth” (515). While methods of testing for ToM have remained standard in humans, 
animal behavioral researchers have worked to devise experiments which replicate 
comparable human tests without a verbal component. The Sally-Anne test is a standard 
protocol used in developmental psychology to identify a child’s capacity to understand 
that they have, and others may hold false beliefs (considered by some a hallmark of ToM) 
about the world. Although this test typically relies on dialogue between researcher and 
subject, variations on this experiment have been devised for animal subjects. More 
recently, researchers have devised non-verbal experiments which test for ToM in both 
children and apes (Marticorena 1406). While much research has been conducted under 
the classical notion of ToM, some researchers in recent years have argued that as a 
concept, it must be narrowed further (Penn and Povinelli 731). And, still others argue that 
ToM may not even be as consequential to reasoning about and predicting the behavior of 
others as previously thought (Heyes 2695). While human understanding of animal 
cognition has developed over the years despite disagreement over conceptual 
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understandings, it seems that the field may be at a crossroads in that conceptual work 
remains. This conceptual work will require not only a better understanding of ToM in 
humans but also the consideration that “mentalistic processes” may play an overstated 
role in predicting the behavior of others. This overestimation may in part be due to the 
long tradition of seeing man as the rational animal. Even more controversially, other 
animals may meet standards for this form of social reasoning long thought to be a 
defining trait of humanity.  
This field of study has operated under a predictive paradigm which expects ToM 
to anticipate behavior. Initial thinking about this capacity attributed a highly predictive 
power to ToM. It was thought that without ToM, beings cannot reliably predict how 
others will behave. Premack and Woodruff established this way of thinking on the subject 
in their 1978 study when they concluded that with only a few exceptions are inferences 
not made in order to predict behavior and “assigning mental states to another individual is 
not a sophisticated or advanced act but a primitive one” (11). These inferences, they say, 
“amount to a theory of mind” and are universally made by humans (11). Their logic was 
as follows: “In assuming that other individuals want, think, believe, and the like, one 
infers states that are not directly observable and one uses these states anticipatorily to 
predict the behavior of others as well as one’s own” (Premack and Woodruff 525). The 
philosopher Kristen Andrews explains in her article “Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: 
Looking in All the Wrong Places” that under the old model, ToM researchers generally 
assumed “a robust predictive function for theory of mind” (524). The assumption that 
assigning mental states was just part and parcel to reading the behaviors of others has, 
over the years, been questioned. This issue was most thoroughly addressed by Daniel 
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Povinelli and Jennifer Vonk in their article “We Don’t Need a Microscope to Explore the 
Chimpanzee's Mind.” In a departure from the predictive paradigm which asserts that 
where there is prediction, there is mentalistic activity, Vonk and Povinelli have suggested 
that a behavioral psychological system can account for most prediction while leaving the 
possibility for a mentalistic psychological system to aid in “responding appropriately in 
relatively novel situations” (Povinelli, Vonk 10). Given the descriptive difficulty in 
distinguishing a mentalistic from a behavioral psychological system, Vonk and Povinelli 
have argued against the experimental paradigm used to conclude chimpanzees do reason 
about behavior and mental states. In their view, the experimental paradigm at the time of 
writing was inadequate in supporting the hypothesis. Going forward, they argue that 
humans should not preclude chimpanzees from being able to reason about mental states, 
however, experimental design must be improved upon to provide greater confidence in 
the conclusions drawn. Central to answering the question of whether non-human animals 
have a ToM is understanding what Vonk and Povinelli termed the “gentle controversy” 
(1). The controversy stems not only from disagreement about how to best investigate and 
study the question at hand but also emanates from the inherent difficulty in distinguishing 
between behavioral and mentalistic processes in the brain. 
The ‘gentle controversy’ refers to the persistent debate within the cognitive 
sciences over whether humans alone demonstrate ToM. This controversy asks the 
question of whether humans “share the ability to reason about mental states (at least to 
some degree) with other species” (Povinelli and Vonk 1). Some researchers argue that 
enough aspects of ToM, as the definition currently stands, have been demonstrated via 
laboratory testing to conclude that “not only is thinking not the exclusive province of 
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human beings, but thinking about thinking is not either” (Schmelz et al 2). Others in the 
arena like Povinelli and Vonk maintain a more conservative view on the conclusions 
which have been drawn. Despite their critique of the current experimental paradigm and 
the conclusions which have been drawn from it, they do not rule out the possibility that 
chimpanzees may be shown to reason about mental states provided certain theoretical and 
methodological issues are addressed. The behavioristic/mentalistic dualism is key to 
understanding the split within the research community and reveals why the search for 
ToM has proved elusive and why the gentle controversy continues to this day. At the 
heart of this controversy is a difference of opinion about how best to test for and 
distinguish the presence of mentalistic process rather than mere behavioral process.    
Many of the studies published on this topic refer to a psychological distinction 
between behavioristic and mentalistic kinds. I will first explain what researchers have 
meant by these terms and then lightly touch on the philosophical problem with creating 
the distinction in the first place. A behavioristic mode of thinking is classically thought to 
stem from prior experience (a posteriori). Prior experiences allow humans and animals to 
reason about behavior based upon their background knowledge. Behavioristic thinking 
might be cue-based meaning learned from specific social situations that have been 
experienced or knowledge-based meaning behavior is predicted based upon an 
extrapolation by an individual about certain stimuli. In contrast, a mentalistic mode of 
thinking presumably does not recruit information from prior experiences. This kind of 
thinking is only demonstrated in novel circumstances, researchers say, when the subject 
has not likely encountered an analogue to the problem at hand. Andrews has noted a 
consensus amongst researchers in regard to animals using a behavioristic kind of thinking 
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to varying degree depending on the circumstance to make basic categorization 
judgements which lead them to predict the behavior of conspecifics and humans (523). A 
lack of consensus remains as to whether non-human animals ever need to rely on a purely 
mentalistic kind of thinking involving the consideration and assignment of mental states 
when prompted to predict behavior. To add greater confusion to the matter, some 
researchers are skeptical about whether human beings even use a mentalistic mode of 
thinking most of the time to predict behavior (Heyes). 
The Current Debate 
While views within the research community have shifted on this question of ToM 
in non-human animals, the debate generally has broken up into two camps. While both 
camps have taken divergent stands in an important respect, namely one presents ToM in 
chimpanzees as a factual claim and the other remains skeptical, they also agree on some 
important points, namely that theory of mind is important for prediction. In one camp, the 
argument for ToM in chimpanzees is asserted as the most parsimonious explanation 
(Tomasello et al 239-240). This interpretation of the empirical evidence relies upon a 
definition of theory of mind that does not require false belief as a necessary condition 
(but continues to pursue its confirmation nevertheless). False belief tasks have been set as 
a bar within the community for full-fledged ToM to be granted. Researchers, like those in 
Leipzig, Germany at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology have set 
out to design better ways to test for this capability. Historically, chimpanzees have not 
been able to pass false belief tests. In 2008, researchers concluded in a 30-year review 
since Premack and Woodruff’s article that while chimpanzees may have certain aspects 
of ToM, they continue to fail tasks that would support the conclusion that they 
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understand false beliefs (Call and Tomasello). However, efforts since 2008 have been 
made to design and conduct more novel studies which have garnered new results. In 
2016, a study was conducted using gaze anticipation to determine whether chimpanzees 
would gaze at a location where they expected another chimpanzee would falsely gaze. 
The authors of the study claim that this experiment showed how “great apes also operate, 
at least on an implicit level, with an understanding of false beliefs” (Krupenye et al 110). 
Researchers in this camp generally argue that while our understanding of false beliefs in 
chimpanzees is nascent, they already demonstrate enough of the other qualities (such as 
seeing and knowing what others see) to say that chimps do have a limited ToM while 
acknowledging there is still more to learn. Another segment of the research community 
argues important theoretical and methodological concerns persist relating to the difficulty 
in distinguishing between behaviouristic and mentalistic processes. This camp claims that 
while certain capabilities have been established in chimpanzees for example, there remain 
too many design flaws within the current research paradigm to claim that compelling 
evidence for “anything even remotely resembling a theory of mind” exists (Penn and 
Povinelli 731). According to Penn and Povinelli, a study done by Hare et al entitled “Do 
Chimpanzees Know What Conspecifics Know” is the most often cited by others as proof 
for theory of mind. They argue the flaw in this study and others like it is found in an 
experimental paradigm that “lacks the power, even in principle, to distinguish between 
responses by the subordinate that could have been produced simply by employing 
observable information and representations of past behavioral patterns (i.e. p- and r-
states) from responses that must have required computations involving information about 
the dominant's unobservable mental states (i.e. ms states)” (Penn and Povinelli 735). 
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At the heart of the divergence of interpretation is a conceptual confusion about what ToM 
minimally requires and what it looks like in non-verbal animals. One proposed solution to 
this impasse articulated by the philosopher Kristen Andrews is to move away from the 
predictive paradigm, toward an explanatory one (Looking in All the Wrong Places 12). 
Under a predictive paradigm, the researcher assumes ToM assists in prediction and that 
statistically significant correct predictions provide evidence of the existence of ToM. 
Under an explanatory paradigm, ToM is presumed to merely explain or make sense of the 
behavior of others. If, as has been suggested, ToM serves primarily an explanatory rather 
than predictive function, then new experimental methods and models not designed around 
the expectation of prediction will be necessary. 
While there is a consensus based on empirical evidence that chimpanzees use 
categories to make basic judgements (one might call this a form of reasoning) researchers 
have not been able to form a consensus regarding mental state attribution in animals. 
Both methodological impediments and philosophical questions remain regarding how 
ToM is currently understood. The current discussion of ToM in animals continues to refer 
to a class-based, binary system of thought that frames questions of animal capability in 
anthropocentric terms. Because ToM is viewed as an important distinguisher that is 
supposed to represent unique powers of the human mind, the way research is conducted 
has implications for making conclusions about animal minds. 
Avoiding Anthropofabulation 
Critics of the way ToM has been studied allude to the influence of 
anthropocentrism in many studies. Buckner identifies three possible expressions of this 
anthropocentrism, those being methodological, evaluative and semantic (2013). Honing 
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in on the semantic errors, Buckner notes a tendency to represent systems according to 
inflated notions of human mental function such as the representation of ToM by Povinelli 
and Vonk (2004). Buckner also notes the methodological concerns brought by Boesch 
(2007) who in a comprehensive review of ToM literature noted “how nearly every 
experiment violates these ideals of fairness by pitting captive chimpanzees against free-
ranging humans, humans working with conspecifics against chimpanzees working with 
heterospecifics, humans with parents nearby against apes without parents nearby, or 
humans on familiar materials against apes on unfamiliar materials” (Morgan’s Canon 
866). Buckner terms these transgressions anthropofabulation. Anthropofabulation is both 
the overestimation of human capacity and comparison of animal minds against an 
exaggerated understanding of human cognition. Such an error serves to devalue other 
minds for lack of complete compliance with some human capacity; a classic 
anthropocentric and domineering move. Theory of mind, a marker of cognition and 
expression of a rational faculty, is an example of the way a research area can perpetuate 
certain hierarchical notions and dualisms which ultimately work to establish animals as, 
in the eyes of science, lesser than rather than non-hierarchically different. Some research 
is being conducted in less anthropocentric terms. From this view, animal minds are 
considered not in contrast to humans but in relation to their respective species-specific 
ecological contexts. 
Executive Control and Rational Inference 
One way to move past the rational/non-rational dualism is to speak more 
specifically about what is meant by the term ‘rationality’ and breaking it down into its 
constituent parts. Cameron Buckner pivots away from the term rationality arguing that 
43 
 
rationality is at base level inference and refers to inference as the “mental process of 
arriving at a conclusion on the basis of reasons which support it” (Rational Inference 2). 
Buckner questions whether language is an important part of establishing rationality in 
order to “defend a model of nonlinguistic inferences that shows how they could be 
practically rational” (Rational Inference 1). Buckner’s “aim is to establish the lowest 
bounds of rational inference, arguing that many (though not all) of these opaque 
judgments in nonlinguistic animals should be counted as inferential” (Rational Inference 
1). This requires, he argues, doing conceptual work in assessing which actions in a sense 
fall into the Cartesian category of automaticity, which have “inferential status” and which 
occupy a middle ground in between (3). Setting up a contrast between theoretical and 
practical inference, Buckner proceeds to argue that “A theory of inference must 
minimally solve this “demarcation problem” by identifying a shared character that 
inferences possess and non‐inferential judgments lack” (2). It is his conclusion that many 
of the observational studies done on elephants, and lions leave open the “possibility of 
rational decision making” in “non-linguistic agents” (Rational Inference 1). Buckner’s 
model for studying and classifying animal cognition is based on a spectrum rather than a 
dichotomy. Such a model can better represent the wide range of cognitive abilities across 
the animal kingdom including capacities for rational inference. Additionally, Buckner is 
drawing on ecologically contextualized studies.   
Cognitive research, so long as it is done in ways that do not harm animals and do 
not further remove animals from wilderness and do not perpetuate narrow paradigms for 
assessing capabilities can assist humanity in part in achieving Gruen’s goal of learning 
more about others and also reflect back ways that we view ourselves as a species. The 
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theory of entangled empathy requires us to attempt to take the perspective of other 
animals. One way this can be done is with a recognition of species-based difference but 
also a scientifically grounded understanding of a given species’ capabilities, including 
cognitive ones. Despite the controversies within animal cognition, the scientific literature 
is clear that animals not only have minds, but they use them in ways that varyingly 
resemble our own. This would ideally be viewed as neither a compliment to nor slight 
against non-human animal cognition. However, such information often has the 
unintended effect of either affirming or disproving preconceived notions about the value 
of non-human animals. Ultimately, the human/nature or more specifically rational/non-
rational dualism will be more difficult to deconstruct than simply observing that other 
animals can demonstrate to varying degree a wide range of cognitive abilities formerly 
denied to them. While it will be difficult to establish a healthy relationship with other 
animals, I will present one possible existential imperative for doing so. As I will propose 
in the final section, the Western view of animals as mindless, non-rational beings 
available for instrumental use by humans presents potentially problematic implications.  
45 
 
Section 4 
Conclusion 
The master culture must now make its long-overdue homecoming to the earth. 
This is no longer simply a matter of justice, but now also a matter of survival. 
 — Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature 
         I began to conceive of this work with an interest in understanding the hyper-
separation between humans and animals. I wondered whether this dynamic might have 
something to do with the way most animals, with the rare exception of certain 
domesticated ones, are not just deplorably treated but are systematically and profitably 
abused and slaughtered for human consumption. My interest in this question led me to 
notice traces of a kind of dualistic thinking that pitted humans against animals in some of 
the formative works chosen from the Western canon. In my research, I detected the 
presence of a system of thought surrounding other animals with rationality at its center. I 
began to question whether current popular opinion about animal cognition was 
evidenced-based or socially constructed. Based on my review of relevant philosophical 
and scientific literature, I concluded that traditional Western conceptions of animal minds 
as minimally conscious and essentially non-rational is more social construct than 
scientific consensus. To come to this conclusion, I reviewed some of the more prominent 
works from the Western canon through an ecofeminist lens, taking note of passages in 
which, the establishment of a clear hierarchy and dualistic thinking could be read. From 
this analysis, a logic of domination emerged. I contend this logic is one of many forces 
which drive the animal agriculture industry and in doing so, has contributed in part to the 
problem of climate change. In this final section, one possible implication of maintaining 
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the traditional conception of animal cognition will be explored. While there are many 
consequences of animal agriculture including risks to public health such as antibiotic 
resistance and novel influenza, I will limit my summary in this final section to a 
description of how a logic of domination in which humans assume superiority and justify 
subordination of animals based on a hierarchy of value that places “rational” humans 
above “non-rational” animals in part bolsters animal agricultural practices which in turn 
contribute partially to climate change. In what follows, I will describe the role of animal 
agriculture in the climate crisis and how I see the ecofeminist constructs of value 
hierarchy and oppositional value dualisms at work in the multifaceted issue of climate 
change. Finally, I will suggest how transitioning away from an animal-based agricultural 
system as ecological feminist praxis may help to reach goals set out by the most recent 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report Global Warming of 1.5° C. 
The Livestock Sector Impact 
The word livestock is etymologically interesting as it encapsulates the 
instrumentalization of nature for human use through the conjunction of counterintuitive 
terms. The term live in the context of the word livestock refers to living, domesticated 
animals such cows, chickens and pigs which are raised for human use and consumption. 
The term stock refers to something that is owned but can be bought and sold. As opposed 
to other forms of property, animals are most notably alive and capable of not just 
sentience but in some cases, higher forms of cognition. The conflation of a conscious 
being with a commodity problematically suggests that living beings are things to be 
owned and used for the profit of others and are to be treated in the same way as inanimate 
objects. The word livestock is only one example of standard industry jargon that has been 
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sterilized to the point of unquestioning acceptance and usage without concern for its 
implications. While there are several known contributors fueling climate change, one 
underestimated yet influential sector is the livestock industry. In 2006, the United Nations 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) published a startling report entitled 
Livestock’s Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options. This report set out to 
assess the full impact of the livestock industry on various environmental measures. The 
study found the livestock sector to account for 18% of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) 
which at the time was a larger proportion than the transportation sector (Steinfeld xxi). 
With improved data collection methods and analysis, the GHG number now stands, 
according to the FAO, at 14.5%. Even at this more conservative number, the livestock 
sector remains one of the major contributors to climate change. In the latest IPCC report, 
“dietary shifts away from emissions-intensive livestock products” in addition to other 
improvements pertaining to the livestock sector “(e.g., improved management of water in 
rice production, manure and herds, and better livestock quality through breeding and 
improved feeding practices)” will be key to following mitigation pathways that are 
compliant with not exceeding a 1.5°C change (Rogellj 147). The report states “Residual 
agricultural emissions can be further reduced by limiting demand for GHG-intensive 
foods through shifts to healthier and more sustainable diets” (147). To clarify, less 
healthy diets are associated with “high animal shares” and healthy diet with “low animal-
calorie shares” (147). While it is noted in the report that “plant based and synthetic 
proteins” will play a role, the extent to which diet will need to be altered is detailed in a 
complimentary report I will reference in the section on diet shift. Given these findings 
and the strong recommendations from the IPCC to transition our agricultural system 
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away from animal to plant-based agriculture, it is worth considering how the human 
species might be incentivized to begin to change the human-animal dynamic from one of 
oppressive mass instrumentalization to one that ceases to see animals, as Cora Diamond 
put it, in the category of ‘edible.’ 
Ecofeminist Constructs 
While the effects of climate change will be far reaching, some groups are 
predicted to be more vulnerable than others to its impacts. Due to structural inequalities, 
women are projected to be disproportionately affected by climate change “primarily as 
they constitute the majority of the world’s poor and are more dependent for their 
livelihood on natural resources that are threatened by climate change” (UN Fact Sheet 
Women, Gender Equality and Climate Change). Additionally, producers of what Carol J 
Adams has called “feminized proteins” bear the greatest burden in the agricultural sector 
(location 438). Climate change is, among many other classifications, a feminist issue. As 
such, ecofeminist constructs can assist in the analysis of and reveal conceptual 
mechanisms which contribute to the climate crisis. Due to the historical glorification of 
rationality and devaluation of non-human animals, a Western hierarchical model would 
place rationality at the top and non-rationality toward the bottom. Humans have always 
occupied the upper thresholds along with rationality and conversely, animals a lower 
threshold. Given this historical conception, animals have traditionally been deemed lesser 
than and due to their supposed non-rational status, subject to the control and domination 
of “higher” powers. It has been my contention that the modern agricultural system, based 
in part on a livestock sector which utilizes the bodies and lives of innumerable animals 
(many of them female) is arguably aided in part by the Western view of animal cognition. 
49 
 
Because of the location of animals on the value hierarchy, the labor done by animals to 
produce food is largely made invisible. While value hierarchies and value dualisms help 
to make visible previously unrecognized relationships, a logic of domination provides the 
reasoning necessary to justify power of one over another. Operating concurrently with a 
value hierarchy are value dualisms such as culture/nature and rational/non-rational 
disjuncts which have reinforced the assumed inferiority of animal lives. It is my 
contention that the same logic of domination that is at work in the Western canon to 
establish the non-rational status of non-human animals and thereafter justify their 
inferiority and separateness may in part facilitate an animal agricultural system that 
commodifies animal lives at the expense of the biosphere. 
One of the minimal criteria for distinguishing ecofeminist scholarship from other 
disciplines and fields of study is the agreement that “important connections between the 
domination of women and the domination of nature” can be made (Warren). As Warren 
describes, the ecofeminist project is to “make visible these connections” and “where 
harmful dismantle them.” This women-nature connection has many formulations. I 
suggest here that the conceptual link between humans and rationality and animals and 
non-rationality should be questioned considering the published research. The dismantling 
of this disjunct is not to be conflated with promoting the notion of sameness or uncritical 
equality (Plumwood, Feminism and Mastery 27). As Gruen explains, “like us” or 
“extentialist” arguments are problematic because they end up reinforcing the dichotomies 
one might seek to deconstruct. In conclusion, I assert that “anti dualist remedies” are 
needed (Plumwood 41). One such remedy, I contend, is diet.     
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Diet Change 
One way to begin to deconstruct the logic of domination is to shift the food 
system away from one that perpetuates a relationship characterized by 
instrumentalization of other conscious and cognitive beings. Gruen’s model provides 
insight into how this can be done. One of her first steps is to acknowledge that “we are 
already in relationships with animals” (Gruen Entangled loc. 174). Once this is done, the 
second step is to assess the “quality and meaning of these relationships” (Gruen 
Entangled loc. 886). It is clear from only a cursory look into conditions in commercial 
livestock operations that they are characterized by abuse and general disregard for animal 
life. Afterall, the express purpose of many facilities is to efficiently snuff animal life out 
for the purposes of human consumption. Knowing this to be the case, on an individual 
scale, aspiring for Veganism is one option (Gruen & Jones). 
Additionally, according to the most recent IPCC report, diets worldwide will need 
to shift towards more plant-based foods to avoid a 1.5 degree Celsius change in 
temperature (above pre-industrial levels). One study from the Oxford Martin Programme 
on the Future of Food, in response to the IPCC investigated the various dietary measures 
that could be taken to have the greatest probability of meeting the UN’s goal. The study’s 
authors stated, “Dietary changes towards healthier diets can reduce the environmental 
impacts of the food system when environmentally intensive foods, in particular animal 
products, are replaced by less intensive food types” (Springmann 3). The report couches 
dietary changes in terms of baseline, moderate and ambitious. Under the ambitious 
guidelines, the world will have the greatest likelihood of meeting targets and mitigating 
the predicted catastrophic effects of climate change. While the authors note a multi-
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pronged approach will be most advantageous, they do also acknowledge that “In line with 
the differentiated impacts of the different measures of change, dietary change contributes 
the most to the reductions in GHG emissions, and technological and management related 
changes contribute the most to reductions in the other environmental impacts, while 
reductions in food loss and waste contribute up to a third to the overall reductions” 
(Springmann). The authors make clear the impact meat consumption has through their 
quantitative data, explicitly stating that: 
Changes in meat consumption dominate the impacts on GHG emissions, while for 
the other domains the environmental pressures associated with greater 
consumption of fruits, vegetables, nuts and legumes are more important but 
outweighed by the environmental benefits associated with lower consumption of 
meat, staple crops and sugar, and a generally lower energy intake in line with 
healthy body weights and recommended levels of physical activity. (Springmann 
et al. 3).  
With regard for reducing environmental pressures, the greatest reductions would come 
about as a result of high ambition measures being taken. 
Combining all measures of medium ambition could reduce environmental 
pressures by around 25–45% compared with the baseline projection for 2050, 
resulting in total environmental impacts that are within 15% above and below 
present impacts. Combining all measures of high ambition could deliver 
reductions of 30–60%, resulting in environmental impacts that are 20–55% less 
than the current ones. (Springmann et al. 3) 
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Considering the threat that climate change poses, it seems that a rational choice 
for the human species given the available options and presumed shared value of 
sustaining life on earth, would be to adhere to a strategy that will provide the best odds of 
avoiding the worst impacts of unprecedented changes to the climate. I have maintained in 
this work that reconceiving of non-human animal minds and reconstructing the human-
animal relationship from one characterized by instrumentalization to one of 
interdependence may play a role in promoting a change in the habits which support an 
unsustainable animal agricultural system that is in part fueling climate change. Becoming 
aware of the historical and cultural conceptions of non-human animal cognition, while 
not guaranteed to directly impact human behavior, may at the very least lead to an 
examination of one’s own relationship to other animals and the environment. Learning 
more about the mental lives of other animals, may nurture a stronger sense of empathy by 
allowing humans to better take the perspectives of non-human animals. Ultimately, time 
spent pondering historical conceptions of non-human animal cognition may illuminate 
something about human cognition that may in turn help humans to live in more 
interdependent and interconnected ways in the world. In the face of climate change, a 
shift in the Western perspective is needed more than ever.  
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